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RECENT CASES
the liabilities of the vendor, although he acquired all the latter's "right,
title and interest"
If, as suggested, the vendor executes a deed to the purchaser and
also one to the assignee, it may be argued that these deeds are, if
executed and delivered at the same time, conflicting and nugatory;
or that, if the deed to the assignee is executed and delivered later, the
vendor has no title to pass. Where the deed to the purchaser is placed
in escrow, however, the legal title still remains in the grantor-6 until
the condition has been performed. The deed to the assignee conveys
only the vendor's interest, expressly subject to the contract. Upon
fulfillment of the contract, the right of the assignee, the holder of this
interest, is at an end.
In Bimrose v. Matthews, supra, it was stated that the title passed
directly from the vendor to the purchaser.' 7 If the vendor had already conveyed all his interest to the assignee, it is difficult to see
how this could be true. But whether the title passes directly or
through the assignee, the purchaser, in the absence of special provisions
in the contract, will have received all he is entitled to, the vendor
will not have given a general warranty and, in the meantime, will
have perfected his right to the purchase money by notifying the purchaser of the assignment and will have acquired the vendor's title as
security by taking and recording the warranty deed from the vendor,
subject to the contract.
Robert B. Porterfield.
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CoMMUNmITY PEOPERTY-SEPDATE PRoPEaTr OF TIE
iVrEZ--CoMUNITY AND
SrPnxA~T Fuxns.-Plaintiff entered into negotiations for lot 5. The purchase
price was $4,000. $1,000 came from the plaintiff's separate funds and the balance was raised by the execution of a mortgage of $2,500 and five notes of $100
each signed by the community. Payments were made upon this mortgage until
about January, 1922, and with $1,600 still remaining unpaid a new mortgage was
executed by the community upon the property for the sum of $3,000, part of
wich was used to pay community debts. Held: The character of property is
to be determined as of the date of its acquisition, and unless such action is
taken thereafter as destroys its character it remains the same. Hence lot 5 is
one-fourth separate and three-fourths community. Zintheo 0. Goodnch Co., 36
Wash. Dec. 161, 239 Pac. 391 (19205).

11In May v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 262, 96 Pac. 451, 1065 (1908), it was held that
pending full payment of the price the legal title remained in the vendor and
was subject to the lien of a judgment against the vendor to the extent of Ins
interest therein.
TThe court also said, "Tis deed was undoubtedly for the purpose of conveying the property to Matthews in case of the failure of Bimrose and wife to
comply with the contract and in case the contract should, for that reason, he
forfeited."
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The objection to this case is that property acquired after marriage and not
by any of the methods required by Rem. Comp. State. §6892, namely, by gift,
devise, or inheritance, can be part separate and part community property. The
authorities in this state indicate that this case is an exception to a well established rule that all property acquired after marriage except by gift, devise or
inheritance is presumptively community property. In Yesler v. Hochstuber
4 Wash. 349, 30 Pac. 398 (1892), the court said, "Under the statutes of this
state, lands acquired after marriage by deed of purchase expressing a money
consideration are presumed to be community property, and the presumption
can be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof that the lands were acquired
by gift or that the consideration was furnished out of the grantee's separate
property." This rule was affirmed in In re Brown's Estate, 124 Wash. 273, 214
Pac. 10 (1923).
Through all the cases this presumption has prevailed with but one exception
and that exception is a line of cases beginning with Heintz v. Brown, 46 Wash.
387, 90 Pac. 211 (1907), and coming down through a series of decisions of which
the case in question is probably the latest. In Heintz v. Brown the court said,
"A rule which permits married persons to commingle separate and community
funds in the acquisition of property after marriage and to assert their separate
property rights, as against creditors of the community is by no means free
from objection, but such a rule is established by the authorities and we feel
constrained to adopt it." The language of the court shows some doubt as to the
correctness of the rule laid down. But the only reason given is that such a
rule is established by the authorities. Uniformity among states is to be encouraged, but uniformity within the state is also very important. Especially
should this be in Washington, where a strong community property system has
been built up.
Our statute provides that all property acquired during marriage, except
property acquired by gift, devise, or inheritance, shall be community property.
Now in this case, the property was acquired after marriage and not by gift,
devise or inheritance, nor wholly with separate funds. Also, there has been
considerable commingling. The property has been mortgaged twice, the first
mortgage was taken in the name of the community and community funds were
used to pay it. The funds obtained by the second mortgage were used in community business. In other words the property has all the aspects of comunity
property and yet it cannot be held for community obligations because a small
sum of separate property was used in its acquisition.
In Siverd v. Dunmestre, 143 La. 57'8, 78 So. 969 (1918), it was held that
property purchased after marriage with part separate and part community
funds, was community property and that the spouse who advanced the separate
funds was to be considered as creditor of community for such funds as was
actually advanced. By the rule in this case there would be less chance for
fraud and less trouble in determining what was community property. If property were acquired during marriage and if any community funds or property
went into its acquisition the presumption that it would be community property
would apply. Then if either spouse had contributed to the acquisition of this
property some separate funds or separate property which could readily be
traced, such spouse would be entitled to reimbursement from the community
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property of such separate funds expended. Tins rule, it is submitted, would be
more within the spirit of the system which the community property laws are
seeking to bring about.
W A. H.
Coi snruTio-r.u LAw-ExEmtpnrroxs.--Respondent had a judgment against
the appellants in the sum of $631.30 for work and labor performed. Execution
was issued on the judgment, by virtue of which the sheriff seized certain personal community property and threatened sale thereof. Thereupon the appellants duly claimed the property as exempt. The property in question was household furniture and wearing apparel and would be exempt from seizure and sale
towards the satisfaction of an ordinary money judgment, being within the
classes of exempt personal property enumerated m Rem. Comp. Stat § 563.
Respondent contends that property is not exempt from execution because of
Rem. Comp. Stat. § 564, which provides that no property shall be exempt from
execution for clerk's, mechamc's or laborer's wages earned within the state.
Hold. That portion of Rem. Comp. Stat. § 564 providing that no property shall
be exempt from execution for specified wages is unconstitutional as an impairment of the exemption rights under Const., Art. 19, § 1, and a violation of the
equal privileges and immunities guaranty of Art 1, § 1-. Yermo v. Hickey,
35 Wash. Dec. 17, -37 Pac. 5 (1925).
Rem. Comp. Stat. § 563, exempting certain personal property from execution was in force in territorial days (Code of 1881, § 347, Laws of 1886, p. 96)
and Art. 19, § 1, of the Constitution, providing that the Legislature shall protect by law from forced sale a certain portion of the homestead and other
property of all heads of families, was self executing, and while the Legislature can modify exemption laws as they existed at the time of the adoption of
the constitution, it cannot destroy exemption rights or enact exemption laws
which violate the equal privileges and immunities guaranty of the Constitution,
and classify general debtors and general debts upon a basis of differing natures
of the debts, so that all debtors shall not have equal exemptions as against all
forced sales to satisfy their existing debts.
The question here presented was first passed upon, in substantially the
same form, in the cast of Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465, 82 Am. Dec. 108 (1882).
Since that time there have been several other cases involving the same point
in Minnesota. These are reviewed, discussed and affirmed in Boferding v.
Mengelkoch, 129 Minn. 184, 152 N. W 135 (1915), the Minnesota court taking
the same view as the principal case. Similar legislative enactments have been
held invalid in Michigan and South Dakota. See Burrows v. Brooks, 113 Mich.
307, 71 N. W 460 (1897), O'Leary v. Croghau, 48 S. D. 210, 173 N. W 844,
6 A. L. R. 1134, (1919).
The contrary view, holding that the Legislature is given power to make
reasonable exemptions, and that what is a "reasonable exemption" may vary
under the circumstances, is presented in a strong dissenting opinion of two
judges in O'Leary v. Croghan, supra. See also In re Vonhee, 238 Fed. 42
(1916), McBride v. Reitz, 19 Kan. 123 (1877), Hazlip v. Hatzlip, 240 Mo. 392,
144 S. V 851 (1916). The latter two cases can be distingmshed, however, on
the different wording of the clause of the Constitution that the court is
interpreting.
As a result of the principal case it would seem that the remainder of Rem.
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Comp. Stat. § 561, providing that there shall be no exemption if the judgment
is for actual necessaries not exceeding $50.00 in value which have been furnished within sixty days preceding the bringing of the action, or if it is against
an attorney or agent for money belonging to his principal, is also unconstitutional.
The case raises a doubt as to the constitutionality of that portion of Rem.
Comp. Stat. § 703, which provides that if a garnishment he founded on a debt
for actual necessaries, no exemption shall be allowed in excess of $10.00 per
week, instead of the usual $100.00 exemption which prevails in the case of an
ordinary judgment. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Bo/erding v. Mengelkoch, supra, holds unconstitutional the following proviso to a statute exempting wages not exceeding $35.00: "Provided, however, that if the action, in
which such attachment, garnishment, or levy of execution is made, is brought
to recover the purchase price of necessaries for the use of the debtor or his
family dependent upon him, and any such debtor shall have been paid wages
amounting to $35.00 or more earned during said thirty day period, then in any
such case, such debtor shall not be entitled to any exemption under tis subdivision in wages earned during said thirty day period, except the tirty-five
dollars theretofore paid." If the Washington court is disposed to follow the
holdings of the Minnesota cases, which it quotes with approval, and its own
suggestion that classifying general debts upon a basis of the differing natures
of the debts, is unconstitutional, then it is submitted that that portion of Rem.
Comp. Stat. § 703 above mentioned, is unconstitutional. However, it must be
remembered that the exemption, as far as garishment is concerned, is not in
compliance with an express command of the constitution. Ordinarily an act is
not class legislation if the classification is reasonable in view of the subject
matter and is uniform as to all classes. "Debtors owing money for necessaries"
would seem to be a reasonable classification.
0. H.
CamxiNA LAw-Ammsr--Sz ARc AN SEIZUE-SuPPRSSION OF EVIDENCE.
-Defendant was arrested by two deputy-sheriffs, without a warrant, for failure to have proper lights and license plates on Ins car. His car was then
searched and intoxicating liquor discovered in it. He was charged with unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. Before trial, he moved for the suppression of the evidence on the ground that it had been unlawfully obtained. Held.
(1) Defendant had been properly arrested. (2) His person or personal property in his control and possession could be searched for evidence tending to
prove the crime for which he was arrested. (3) Evidence tending to prove any
crime could be seized where the search was lawful and the evidence was proper
to introduce at the trial. State v. Deitz, 36 Wash. Dec. 186, 239 Pac. 386 (1925).
The first two propositions of the court's decision are well established in
this state and elsewhere. (1) An officer may, without a warrant, arrest for a
misdemeanor committed in Ins presence, even though the misdemeanor does not
amount to a breach of the peace. State v. Llewellyn, 119 Wash. 306, 205 Pac.
394 (1922). However, an officer can not arrest without a warrant when he
merely suspects that a misdemeanor is being committed in his presence. State
v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922), Mitchell v. Hughes, 104 Wash.
231, 176 Pac. 1 (1918).
(2) After a proper arrest has been made, (even though without a warrant),
the officer may search the person and personal property of the person arrested,
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and in his control and possession at the time. State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash.
366, -14 Pac. 841 (1923), Carroll v. United States, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. -80, 69
Adv. 0. 347 (1925). Any evidence tending to prove the crime for which the
arrest was made may be seized. State v. Hughlett, supra; Carroll v. United
States, supra.
The turd proposition is, however, a new and rather startling extension of
the doctrine that the person arrested may be searched. It is, for all that, an
extension that might have been expected.
The history of this whole phase of the law has been one of logical extension. Originally, the person arrested might be searched, and anything which
might help him escape could be seized. Then, anything found on his person
tending to prove the crime for which he was arrested could be seized.
The next step was to extend the right to search to suitcase, grips or other
personalty which the arrested man might have, and again, anything tending to
prove the crime might be seized.
In State v. Hughlett, supra, the court said that it was only logical that the
automobile, driven by the arrested person might be searched. Now, State v.
Deitz, gives us the final step: Person or personalty may be searched, and evidence tending to prove any crime may be seized.
C. J. P.
CRImNAL LAw-SusrExsio
OF SENTEXE.-Relator was charged by information with the crime of grand larceny, alleged to have been committed on
February 25, 1925. He pleaded guilty to the charge, and made a full confession of a series of offenses, beginmng some two years prior thereto, through
which he had obtained from various brokers the sum of ten thousand dollars.
The relator was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and sentence was suspended pending good behavior.

Thereupon, relator was charged by information with a new and independent
offense, (grand larceny), alleged to have been committed on January 26, 19,5.
To this charge a plea of guilty was entered, and motion made to suspend
sentence. Motion was demed by trial court on authority of Rem. Comp. Stat.
§2B80. Relator filed application for a writ of prohibition to restrain imposition of sentence.
Held. Writ demed-that provision for suspended sentences on first conviction of lesser offense than those enumerated did not authorize suspension
of second conviction of crime committed prior to that resulting in first conviction. State ex rel Zbznden v. Superior Court, 35 Wash. Dec. 314, 238 Pac.
9 (1925).
The statute in question provides that "whenever any person never before
convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor shall be convicted of any crime
except murder or burglary in the first degree, robbery, arson in the first degree,
carnal knowledge of female child under the age of ten years, or rape, the court
may suspend sentence in its discretion, and direct that sentence be suspended
until further order of court, etc."
By the weight of authority, apparently courts have no inherent power to
suspend sentence. State ex rel Lundin v. Superior Court, 102 Wash. 600, 174
Pac. 473 (1918), Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27, 61 L. Ed. 129, 37 Sup.
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Ct. Rep. 72, L. R. A. 1917E 1178 (1916) People v. Morresette, 20 How. Pr.
118 (1860)
People v. Brown, 54 Mich. 15, 19 N. W 571 (1884)
People
v. Kennedy, 58 Mich. 372, 25 N. W 318 (1885) State v. Voss, 80 Iowa 467,
45 N. W 898 (1890), In re Webb, 89 Wis. 354, 62 N. W 177 (1895) State v.
Hockett, 129 Mo. App. 689, 108 S. W 599 (1908). However, it seems the contrary view has been upheld in some courts: Commonwealth v. Maloney, 145
Mass. 205, 13 N. E. 482 (1887) Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133 (1874), State v.
Whlitt, 117 N. C. 804, 23 S. E. 452 (1895), Weber v.State, 58 Ohio St. 616, 51
N. E. 116 (1898) State v.Buckley, 75 N. H. 402, 74 At. 875 (1909).
It should be noticed that some of the cases cited as upholding the view
that the court has power inherent in itself to suspend execution of sentence,
related to delays in imposing sentence rather than suspension of execution.
Manifestly, in those jurisdictions holding that the courts have no inherent
power to suspend execution of sentence, such power can only be exercised where
the legislature has granted it-Ex parte United States, supra (page 52 of
decision). In the absence of a statute granting the power, the only remedy of
the person seeking to stay the execution of the sentence imposed is to seek
executive clemency.
In the principal case, the crime charged in the second information occurred
prior in time to the crime charged in the first information. However, the
statute makes no provision for a situation like this, and, as the court points
out, the statute being clear and unambiguous, and the legislative intent being
manifested, there is no room for interpretation or construction. The statute
being clear and unambiguous and the language plain, the court cannot give a
different meamng to subserve public policy. Lewis' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CowsTRucrios, (3rd ed.) §367, page 705.
The statute relating to punishment of habitual criminals, where it must
appear that the subsequent crime was committed after the date of the first
conviction of accused, and this probably even where the statute is silent on the
subject, (Underhill Criminal Evidence, 3rd ed., par. 772), has no application
in the principal case as the statute in question does not call for exercise of
pumshment, but extends special lemency in cases coming within its provisions.
A. R.
LImiTATioNs OF AcTios-Ac'noxs FOR RELIEF UPON THE GROUND OF
FaPAuD.-One H, while president of the plaintiff corporation, the H Realty
Company, executed deeds, in the company's name, but without authority, to
the defendant, of certain property owned by the corporation. He made the
deeds to her as a marriage settlement, no consideration whatever moving to the
plaintiff. The deeds were made in October, 1915, and August, 1916, respectively.
He died in July 1921. He and his wife, the defendant, who had been made a
trustee of the corporation, had meanwhile been in complete control of the
corporation's affairs. In March, 1923, the plaintiff began this action, seeking
the recovery of the property and the removal of the clouds upon its title, the
clouds being the conveyances to the defendant. It was contended by the defendant that the action is barred by the statute of limitations; specifically, by
§159, Rem. Comp. Stat., (P C. §8166), subdiv. 4, prescribing three years for
the commencement of "An action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause
of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued untl the discovery by
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the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud" Hold. That this was
not an action for relief upon the ground of fraud, within the meaning of the
statute, und was not barred. Hutchtnson Realt. (o. v. Hutchnson, 36 Wash.
Dec. 151, 239 Pac. 388 (1925).
This decision is based upon the rather nice distinction that although there
may have been fraud present, (and the court does not admit that there was),
yet fraud is not of the essence of the cause of action. It is rather only an
incident thereto. The true cause is, rather, the existence of the cloud upon the
plintiff's title to the land, raised by the deeds in question, which are void for
lack of consideration.
The opinion quotes from Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 28 Pac. 1109, 29
Pac. 927, 28 Am. St. Rep. 56, 15 L. R. A. 781 (189-), wherein the rule of this
case was first set forth in this state: "That section (the one under consideration) we think has reference to suits by parties to contracts who are asking to
be relieved from contracts that they were fraudulently induced to make, as
where a deed has been fraudulently obtained, and suits of that character
where fraud is the substantive cause of the action."
Or, as stated in Thomas v.Richter, 88 Vash. 451, 153 Pac. 333 (1915), "To
constitute an action for 'relief on the ground of fraud, the fraud must be the
substantive cause of the action, the cause without which the action would not
exist; the fraud must have been practiced upon the complaining party, causing
him to assume some obligation or liability or suffer some loss which but for the
fraud he would not have assumed or suffered."
In Bradbury v. Nethercutt, 5 Wash. 670, 16-. Pac. 194 (1917), in an action
to quiet title, it is said, "But the gravamen of this action is to quiet title and,
even though fraud is practiced in creating the cloud, it is not subject to the
three-year limitation in actions for relief on the ground of fraud."
The rule appears in a number of other Washington cases previous to the
principal case. See rnfra. There are also cases in which the rule should have
been applied, but was not. One of these is Unton Trust Co. v. Amery, 2nfra,
of which the court in the present opiiion says: "
may be out of harmony
with the early decision in Wagner v. Law, supra, but, as we skall presently see,
the decision in Wagner v.Law has been adhered to in our later decisions." The
Richter case, supra, arising out of facts very similar to the Amery case, both
being upon unlawful diminutions of the capital stock of corporations, applies
the rule, and holds fraud not to be the gravamen of such an action.
In Carroll v. Hill Tract Improvement Co., infra, in an action to quit title,
the cloud upon which was created by a fraudulent sheriff's sale redemption
certificate, it was squarely held that the action was barred by the statute in
question. The decision is clearly contrary to the principle of Wagner v. Law,
and to the very letter of the subsequent Nethercutt case, heretofore quoted.
The Improvement Company case has never been cited in tis connection by
the Washington court.
As the court well says, "The problem of whether or not an action is for
'relief upon the ground of fraud' in any given case has been fruitful of much
concern and some, at least seeming, conflict of views in the courts of this
country." This is putting it most conservatively. An example of the concern
evoked is furnished by the Oklahoma court, in the Campbell v. Dick opinions.
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In the first one, 157 Pac. 1062 (May, 1916), the action was held to be one seekmg "relief on the ground of fraud," and hence barred, reversing the trial court
wich had considered it as one for the recovery of real property, and subject
only to their 15 year statute. But in April, 1918, the case coming before them
again, the court turned a complete flip-flop, holding the action to be one for
the recovery of realty. In doing so, they expressly disapproved the authorities
upon which the first opinion had been founded, including their own case of
Webb v. Long, 48 Okl. 354, 150 Pac. 116 (June, 1915). This second opinion is
reported in 172 Pacific, at page 782. But the court, apparently still unsatisfied,
wrote decision No. 3, 71 Old. 186, 176 Pac. 520 (Nov., 1918), which is, however,
essentially the same as No. 2. And although tis was to supersede No. 2, we
find the opinion in Etenburn v. Neary, 77 Okl. 69, 186 Pac. 457 (1919), quoting
at length from the second of the trinity. But it quoted, at least, with approval.
Meanwhile, Franklin v. Ward, 72 Old. 282, 174 Pac. 244 (May, 1918), was decided, and accords with these cases. So the rule in that jurisdiction may now
be said to be established. The timorous bird has lit. The Campbells have
come. That the Justices were at all times striving for peace is indicated by
the fact that in none of the Campbell triad was there a single dissenting
opinion.
The rule appears to be as strictly, and harshly, defined in Washington as
in any other jurisdiction. As for the country as a whole, it is probably impossible to bring any sort of order out of the chaotic multitude of cases. Here
and there a likely-looking line of demarcation suggests itself, but invariably
the next case examined proves the line to have been drawn in very pale ink.
The distinction in the cases concerning fraudulent conveyances, may lie in the
difference between void and viodable deeds. It sometimes appears, with a naive
disconcern for logic, that fraud is held not to be the gravamen in cases where,
if it were, the action would be barred; and held as the gravamen where the
plaintiff needs must call upon the provision regarding discovery to toll the
statute.
Among the cases where the question of the prmcipal case has arisen, and
the substantive cause of action held to be other than that of fraud, are:
Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 28 Pac. 1109, 29 Pac. 927, 98 Am. St. Rep.
56, 15 L. R. A. 784 (1892) Evert v. Tower 51 Wash. 514, 99 Pac. 580 (1909)
Cornell v. Edsen, 78 Wash. 662, 139 Pac. 602, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 279 (1914)
Thomas v. Richter 88 Wash. 451, 153 Pac. 333 (1915) Golden Eagle Mining Co.
v. Imperator-Quilp Co., 93 Wash. 692, 161 Pac. 848 (1916) Bradbury v. Nethercutt, 95 Wash. 670, 164 Pac. 194 (1917) Myers v. Exchange National Bank,
Rogers, 117 Wash. 161,
96 Wash. 244, 164 Pac. 951 (1917) Shaw v. Rogers
200 Pac. 1090 (19-1).
Sandoval v. Randolph, 11 Ariz. 371, 95 Pac. 119 (1908) Oakland v. Carpentier 13 Cal. 552 (1859) Clausen v. Meister 93 Cal. 555, 29 Pac. 232 (1892)
Goodnow v. Parker 112 Cal. 437, 44 Pac. 738 (1896) People v. Kings County
Development Co., 177 Cal. 529, 171 Pac. 102 (1918) New Albany National
Holmes v. Culver
Bank v. Brown, 63 Ind. App. 391, 114 N. E. 486 (1916)
89 Kan. 698, 133 Pac. 164 (1913) Liter v. Ford, 201 Ky. 686, 258 S. W 110
(1924) Ross v. Saylor 39 Mont. 559, 104 Pac. 864 (1909) Miller v. Walser,
42 Nev. 497 181 Pac. 439 (1919)
Logan v. Brown, 20 Okl. 334, 95 Pac. 441
(1908) Campbell v. Dick, 172 Pac. 782, 71 Okl. 186, 176 Pac. 520 (1918), and
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see remarks supra concerning this case; and Model Bldg. k Loan Ass'n, v.
Reeves; 936 N. Y. 331, 140 N. E. 715 (1923). The New York case is somewhat
similar to, and supports, the Washington case of Cornell v. Edsen, supra, one
of the most extreme of our cases.
And where the fraud itself was held to be the cause of action: Morgan V.
Morgan, 10 Vash. 99, 38 Pac. 1054 (1894) Carroll v. Hill Tract Improvement
Co., 44 Wash. 569, 87 Pac. 835 (1906) and Union Trust Co. v. Amery, 67 Vash.
1, 10 Pac. 539 (1919), see remarks supra regarding these two cases; Feenstra
v. Feenstra,194 Wash. 135, 213 Pac. 466 (1923) Kiener v. Hood, 16 Wash, 431,
218 Pac. 1 (1923).
Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Cal. 30, 87 Am. Dec. 146 (1865) Dulf v. Duff 71
Cal. 513, 1- Pac. 570 (1886), Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 120
Pac. 771, Ann. Cas. 1913C 1093 (1911) James v. James, 75 Colo. 156, 2-75 Pac.
208 (1924), Hillock v. Idaho Title 4 Trust Co., 22 Id. 440, 126 Pac. 61-0 (191-0),
Wiogand v. Shepard, 105 Kan. 405, 184 Pac. 702 (1919), Foy v. Greenwade, 111
Kan. 111, 206 Pac. 33-0 (1922) Combs v. Grigsby, 200 Ky. 31, 25-0 S. W 111
(1923), Delmoe v. Long, 35 Mont. 38, 88 Pac. 778 (1907), Tuttle V. Tuttle, 146
N. C. 484, 59 S. E. 1008 (1907), and Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 200
S. W 1104 (Tex., 1918).
H. S.
Mu iciPAL ComnonAboxs-SPEcIAL. AssESSrXXTS--Pi oaTr OF Lmwis.-At a
sale of certain property for general taxes, King County secured an amount in
excess of the taxes due and costs of the sale, which it paid over to the City of
Seattle, under Rem. Comp. Stat. § 9393, to discharge all local assessment liens
against the said property. The sum so paid over did not equal in amount the
total of the outstanding assessments, and the city officials announced their
intention to pro-rate the amount received among the holders of the various
liens. This action is brought by the holder of a local improvement bond,
secured under the fifth of the six outstanding assessments, to enjoin the city
from carrying into effect its plan of pro rata distribution. Held. Injunction
refused, the city to proceed with distribution according to its pronounced
intention. Dissenting opinion: The distribution should take place on a basis
of priority, the earlier liens to have preference. Hollenbeck v. City of Seattle,
36 Wash. Dec. 407, 240 Pac. 916 (1925), overruling Seattle v. Everett, 125
Wash. 39, 2315 Pac. 337 (1923) insofar as the holdings of the two cases are
inconsistent.
It is the rule in this state and elsewhere that special assessments for local
improvements are levied under the general taxing power of -the sovereign
authority. Seattle v. Hill, 14 Wash. 487, 45 Pac. 17, 35 L. R. A. 370 (1896)
Carstens 4" Earles v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 88, 146 Pac. 381, Everett v. Adamson,
106 Wash. 355, 180 Pac. 144 (1919) and dicta in State ex rel Case v. Howell,
85 Wash. 281, 147 Pac. 1162 (1915) Malette v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 905, 139 Pac.
596 (1913). In general, see 1 Coorx-y, TAxATioi (4 ED.), § 31, p. 107, and
432 6
et seg.
notes. Also 5 M cQuILL-, MuNxcIPA CoRPoRATIONS, § 2017, p.
Special assessments differ from general taxes in fundamental respects, and
Cooley, cited above, takes notice of the distinction to such an extent that he
does not discuss special assessments at all in his new edition, referring the
reader to McQuillin for a discussion of the principles. Footnotes 81-84,
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1 Coorxy, TAXATION, 107. See also 1 ABBOTT, MUNICIPAL CoaROa'rxoos, § 337,
p. 774 et seq.
Thus special assessments, while levied under the general taxing power of
the state, are not charges for the support of the government. They are justified solely on the basis that they charge the property benefited by the improvements with the value of the improvements. 98 Cyc. 1102; 1 CooLEy, TAXATION,
105; 1 ABaoTT, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra, and cases cited.
Under the Washington statutes, funds derived from special assessments
are not to be commingled with the general tax funds of the state or counties,
but are to be kept apart according to the assessment districts of the various
improvements. So a "trust fund" is created, admimstered by the proper
municipal authorities, for the discharge of the obligations incurred when the
work was performed. Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 9380, 9383 and 9384.
Because of the fact that special assessments and the resultant liens arising
therefrom are wholly creatures of statutory creation, the general rule prevails
that the Legislature may by statute give these liens any rank or priority that
it deems expedient. Seattle v. Hill, supra; Woodill - Hulse Electrc Co., 180
Cal. 667, 182 Pac. 422 (1919) Gould v. City of St. Paul, 120 Minn. 172, 139
N. W 293 (1913)
5 MCQUILLIX, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 2110, p. 4494;
1 ARBorr, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs, § 389, pp. 948-9. For examples of types
of legislative enactments creating priorities, see Cahill, Consolidated Laws of
New York, 1923, Ch. 65, § 113; Idaho Compiled Statutes of 1917, § 4007 Rem.
Comp. Stat., § 9372. Not creating priorities, but creating liens: Throckmorton's
General Code of Ohio, 1921, § 3897 General Laws of Massachusetts, 1921, Vol.
1, p. 759, Ch. 80, § 12. Whether statutes giving priority to local assessment
liens refer to such liens as a class or to the individual liens depends on the
interpretations of the particular statutes. In Washington the liens arising out
of local assessments are superior to the ordinary liens arising out of contract,
and inferior to the liens of general taxes. Rem. Comp. Stat., § 9372, "
Such lien shall be paramount and superior to any other lien or encumbrance
whatsoever, theretofore, or thereafter created except a lien for assessments for
general taxes." Maryland Realty Co. v. Tacoma, 121 Wash. 230, 209 Pac. 1
(1922)
Seattle v. Altar 122 Wash. 367, 2010 Pac. 664 (1922)
Everett v.
Adamson, 106 Wash. 255, 180 Pac. 144 (1919). However, this section is held
not to apply in favor of the holder of certificates of delinquency for general
taxes as against a lien for subsequent local improvements held by a city.
Seattle v. Everett, 125 Wash. 39, 915 Pac. 337 (1923).
Where the question of priority is among local assessment liens of the same
class, as in the instant case, there are three theories of priority, i. e..
I. The general tax rule of inverse priority- "Last in time, first in nght."
In support of tis rule, it is argued that since special assessments are levied
under the general taxing power of the state they should follow the general
tax rule of inverse priority. The Supreme Court of Washington approved
this rule and reasoning in a dictum in Seattle v. Everett, supra, and to this
extent that opinion is overruled by the case under discussion. It is replied to
this argument that it does not take into account the fundamental distinction
between general taxes and special assessments, the former being levied to
secure revenue for the support of the government, and the latter to place the
charges for local improvements on the property benefited thereby. It is fur-
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ther contended in support of this rule that the later improvements enhance the
value of the property (which is the security of the prior liens), and that therefore, having the advantage of this increased security, the prior liens should be
subservient to the later ones. Of course, the obvious answer to this contention
is that the improvements for which the prior assessments were levied likewise
increase the value of the security of the later liens. A further argument in
favor of ths theory based on an interpretation of Rem. Comp. Stat., § 9379,
is that since each lien at its creation is made superior to all other liens,
such latter lien should naturally prevail. This does not account for the presence of the word "thereafter" in the statute. For cases supporting tlns theory
Hulse Electric Co. v. Young, supra;
see Seattle v. Everett, supra; Woodill
Burke v. Lukens, 19 Ind. App. 648, 40 N. E. 641, 54 Am. St. Rep. 539 (1895),
Jawcks v. Oppenheimer, 964 Mo. 693, 175 S. W 979 (1915), Gould v. City of
St. Paul, supra.
II. The ordinary Hen rule of chronological priority. The exponents of
this rule claim that in the absence of statutory disposition, the ordinary lien
rule should prevail. To this it may be said that since this lien is solely of
statutory creation, its status must be determined as far as possible from the
intent of the Legislature that created it, as evidenced by the creative act.
Thus the instant case turns largely upon the interpretation of the local improvement act of 1911. Laws of 1911, Ch. 98, p. 441 et seq; Rem. Comp. Stat.
§§ 935-94-95 passim. It is further contended that since the later lienholders
secure their interests subsequent in time to the interests of the earlier Henholders, they are charged with knowledge of the existing rights of their predecessors, and consequently should take subject to these rights. Also, the
adoption of any other rule than that of chronological priority, it is said,
would render of doubtful value the security of the holder of local improvement bonds, since no person purchasing such bonds would be able to ascertain
what might be levied against the property in the future. Contra, it is propounded that the holder of the security should be in no better position than
the owner of the fee, who must hold at all times subject to the future right
of the sovereign or municipality to tax or assess. In support of this general
rule see: Des Moines Brick Co. v. Smith, 108 Ia. 307, 79 N. W 77 (1899),
Scott-McClure Land Co. v. City of Portland,62 Ore. 469, 195 Pac. 976 (1919),
Bell v. City of New York, 66 App. Div. 578, 73 N. Y. S. 998 (1901), Philadelphia v. Meager 67 Pa. St. 345 (1871), Parker-WashingtonCo. v.- Corcoran,
150 Mo. App. 188, 199 S. W 1031 (1910) (discussed but not followed by the
Missouri Supreme Court in Taicks v. Oppenheimer, supra).
III. The rule of strict parity and equality. In Minnesota a double situation arises. The statute made assessment liens of equal rank with general tax
liens, and under tis statute the general tax rule of inverse priority prevails.
However, as between liens arising in a single year, no priority will be allowed
and the liens of that year are made of equal rank. Gould v. City of St. Paul,
supra. In the instant case, the majority opinion maintains that there appears
in the Washington statutes an active intent to make successive local assessment
liens of equal merit; that although the wording of the creative section (i. e.,
§ 9379) is ambiguous when applied to liens of the same class, succeeding sections indicate such an intent. See Rem. Comp. Stat, §§ 9384-9388, incl. These
sections relate to the enforcement of tax and assessment liens by sale or foreclosure. They provide in substance that the purchaser must pay or assume
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all taxes or assessments against the property at the time of purchase, and also
that the property cannot be sold for less than enough to pay all such taxes
and assessments.
Apart from the interpretation of statutes, the principal argument in support is that it works substantial justice as between the parties, although the
usual argument against pro rata distribution can be mentioned, Vz., that no
one gets all of that to which he is entitled. For a further case in support of
this theory of distribution see Brownell Improvement Co. V. Nixon, et al, 48
Ind. App. 195, 92 N. E. 693 (1910).
W S .T.
PRIVATE COROATIOx-s--THE "TRusT FUND" DocTRixE.-Hoppe, Trustee, v.
First National Bank, 37 Wash. Dec. 61, 241 Pac. 662 (1925), is one of the first
cases on the return flight of the "trust fund" doctrine from its apogee. (See
"The Trust Fund Theory- A Study in Psychology," 1 WAsH. L. REV., p. 81).
The case was taken up, and affirmed, on Superior Judge Paul's elaborate findings of fact, a study of which reveals the following as salient facts: Two
separate transactions were involved; (1) payments in July and December of
19-2 on a preexisting debt and (2) repayment in March, 1923, of a debt
incurred March 1, 1923, to engage in a specific business deal. October, 1923,
a receiver was appointed because of insolvency December, 1923, the corporation was adjudged bankrupt. The findings indicate that the corporation was
actually "insolvent" during all this time, but that it transacted its business in
the ordinary course with all appearances of solvency. The key finding was
that although the defendant bank had ample means of knowing the exact
financial condition of the corporation and should have known it, yet it was
fully justified in believing that the concern would pull out.
Under these findings it was held that the "trust tund" doctrine did not
apply. Implicit in the decision, although inarticulate, is the thought that the
courts should not interfere with a bona fide transaction in which the creditor
is liquidating his debt without reasonable cause to believe the corporation
doomed to dissolution: an illustration of the modern process of business law
being molded by business exigencies, the merely logical being justly superseded
by the presently practical.
H. Zettler.
ToRTs-DEcEIT---MISREPRESENTATION AS TO IXTETio.,;.-In the recent case
of Kritzer v. Mofat, 36 Wash. Dec. 327, 240 Pac. 355 (1925), some land of
the plaintiff was sold at an execution sale and during the year of redemption
the plaintiff went to the defendant, who was in charge of her affairs, and told
him that she had the money to redeem the land and that she wished him to take
the necessary steps toward its redemption. The defendant made the promise
to see that the land was redeemed btfore the period was up, but in fact he did
not intend to redeem the property, but allowed it to be sold to himself, he having previously bid it in at the sheriff's sale, and took the title to the land at the
expiration of the redemption period; thereby securing a profit to himself. The
court held that the action of decit would lie, since the defendant made the
promise never intending to keep it.

This case is following the doctrine outlined in the old case of Swift v.
Rounds, 19 R. I. 597, 35 Atl. 45 (1896), where it was held that when a
man bought goods promising to pay for them at a future date, but having the
present intention never to pay for them, that an action for deceit would lie.
The question of present intent is always important in this class of cases,
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and is clearly a question for the jury to decide; but since the case of Edgzngton v. Fitzmaurce, 99 Ch. Div. 459 (1885), when it was announced that "The
state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion," the
weight of authority has held that when a present intent never to pay is shown,
an action for deceit will lie. Stewart v. Emerson, 59 N. H. 301 (1879) Seymour v. Wilson, 14 N. Y. 567 (1856), Goodwzi v. Home, 60 N. H. 485 (1881)
Hill v. Gettys, 135 N. C. 373, 47 S. E. 449 (1904), Hewett v. Dole, 69 Wash. 163,
124 Pac. 374 (1919), and Rozell v. Vansyckle, 11 'Vash. 79, 39 Pac. -70 (1895).
G. De G.
TRUSTs-l"AGEMENT

or

TRUST ESTATES-SALES 3BY TRUSTEES-COPLI-,ATCE

WiTH TrausT-DiaEicr-EvnIENCE-SUIE2TcY.-H,

the sole beneficmary of
her parents' estates, obtained the appointment of a trust company as trustee
for the disposition of the property. The order of appointment provided that
the property was to be reduced to cash within six months from the date of the
decree or after that period sold to the lghest and best bidder as provided by
law. No sale of the property was made within the six months and the beneficiary signed a letter prepared by the trust company in which she said that it
was her judgment that the property should not be sold at that time. Subequently offers were received for various portions of the property but were
rejected as inadequate. Meanwhile the trustee was paying taxes and assessments on the property out of its own funds and advancing money to the
beneficiary, there bring no money in the estate. A later agreement to sell a
part of the property, resulted in a lawsuit between the purchaser and the trust
company in wluch judgment went against the company. Finally, thirteen years
after the appointment, the trust company filed its final accounting, to which
the beneficiary objected. Held. That the neglect to sell within the first six
months of the trusteeship did not amount to msmanagement of the trust.
The court after remarking that it was true that if the property had been
sold within the first six months of the trusteeship, even at a sacrifice sale, it
would have brought more than it eventually did, states that the officers of the
trust company "are not endowed with any greater ability to foresee the final
outcome of such matters than are the general run of individuals.' "The trustee should be chargeable only with the final result of the handling of the
estate, where there has been bad faith or negligence on its part, but when it
acts with that care and caution that like trustees display and defers to the
wishes of the beneficiary, whom it represents, it should not be penalized therefore." Hancock v. Muldoon, 36 Wash. Dec. 197, 039 Pac. 546 (1925).
As a general rule 'the measure of care and diligence required of a trustee
is such as would be pursued by a man of ordinary prudence and skill in the
management of his own estate." Campbell v. Miller 38 Ga. 304, 95 Am. Dec.
389; Litchflield v. White, 7 N. Y. 438, 51 Am. Dec. 534; Fesmire's Estate, 134
Pa. St. 67, 19 Atl,,509, 19 Am. St. Rep. 676 (1890) Phila. Trust Co.s Appeal,
144 Pa. St. 79, 00 AtI. 831, 14 L. R. A. 103 (1891), IN re Adams, 291 Pa. St.
77, 70 AUt. 436, 198 Am. St. Rep. 797, 15 Ann. Cas. 318 (1908).
Hut chwson v.Lord, 1 Wis. 286, 60 Am. Dec. 381 (1853), Weltner v. Thurmond, 17 Wyo. 968, 98 Pac. 590, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1113 (1908). Supine negligence or wilful default will render trustees liable, but to make them liable for
mere errors of judgment would tend to discourage good and prudent men from
undertaking such a trust. Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 684 (1858).
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Mere inadequacy of price is no ground for charging the trustee with lack
of ordinary care, or setting aside the sale, providing the transaction is otherwise properly conducted. Franklin v. Osgood, 14 Johns. 52 (1817), Singleton v.
Scott, 11 Iowa 589 (1859) Glenn v. Augusta PerpetualBldg. k L. Co., 99 Va.
695, 40 S. E. 25 (1901).
The principal case holds that the court order for the sale to be made
within six months is "directory and not mandatory," and that the omission to
sell within the time of the decree is not per se mismanagement, citing In re
Abram's Estate, 114 Wash. 51, 194 Pac. 787 (1921).
L. S.

BOOK REVIEWS
By Frederick C. Hicks. St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1925. pp. 1180.
Mr. Hicks has published a timely book in this collection of -4 arguments
of noted American advocates ranging in period from 1884 to 1924, and in
style from Choate to Darrow. His title, however, conveys only a half truth,
for 12 of the arguments reported were delivered before Courts without juries
in Admiralty Equity, Probate, etc.
Your reviewer chooses to take the author at his word in attaching special
significance to the type of tribunal addressed, and to emphasize the method
and manner of presentation rather than the analysis of the law involved.
After all, the chief interest of the book lies in its reflected illumination of
the jury system, and all the light we can get on that subject should be welcomed by those interested in legal reform. For the Trial Jury is itself
definitely on trial in this 20th century, the 7th of its institutional existence
among us of Anglo-Saxon tradition. Its precurser and long time compamon
device for securing the liberty of the individual, the jury of Presentment, has
already, for practical purposes, lapsed into a state of mocuous desuetude,
though still formally employed (of necessity by the Federal government) to
register the decisions of the official prosecuting agency. Its original ralson
d'Otre becomes less and less cogent with the growth of urban communities.
Likewise we find the trial jury becoming, the victim of another aspect of the
same circumstances. Complex industrial and business relationships determine
the character of a greater and greater portion of our litigation both civil and
criminal, and this matter of "taking the lay mind" of the community on the
facts in dispute taxes to the breaking point the capacity of both the advocate
and the judge who conscientiously attempt to unravel the technical evidence
introduced for the benefit of the jurymen.
In view of these facts it is encouraging to read the text edited by Mr.
Hicks, for it is only fair to say that the speeches selected are, most of them,
remarkably temperate in tone, keen in analysis, and well ordered. No man's
judgment on the jury system is more to be relied upon than that of the
practitioner, and the real nature of that judgment is best indicated by the
character of the appeal made to the twelve men in the box.
Public interest in the operation of the jury centers upon its application
to criminal procedure both because of the more spectacular character of the
trial, and the immediate vital human interests involved. Mr. Hicks has incorporated five speeches delivered by counsel in such cases. It is interesting to
note that more attention in the selection has been given to the presentation of
the case for the State than for the defense. Having in mind both the inherent
disadvantages of the prosecution due to Constitutional safeguards, as well as
the almost invariable lack of experience on the part of those charged with the
prosecuting function, we are warranted in feeling some solicitude for the
effectiveness of this particular part of the administration of justice. Francis
FAMOUS JUtRY SPEECHES.

